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Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global Power

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China's rapid economic rise and growing assertiveness in relations with other nations has provoked concern in Washington that America is facing a new rival for global dominance.  World Bank estimates suggest China may surpass the purchasing power of the U.S. economy as early as this year, meaning that America will cease being the world's biggest producer of wealth for the first time since it overtook Britain on the eve of the 1876 centennial.  U.S. critics of Beijing frequently ascribe China's success to mercantilist trade policies, and point to other irritants such as growing military investment and state-directed cyber attacks to depict the Middle Kingdom as a menace on the march.

It certainly doesn't help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administration's restrained response in Ukraine to "erectile dysfunction."  However, there is no need to make the administration's Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War, because for all its dynamism China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were.  This is partly due to intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on China's ability to continue advancing.  Those limits don't get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining China's power potential.

1. Geographical constraints.  Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, China's potential for territorial growth is severely limited by geography.  To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert.  To the south the Himalayan mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent.  To the north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia.  And to the east stretches the world's largest ocean (there are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco).  So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and China's historical claim to Taiwan, there isn't much opportunity for wars of conquest on China's periphery.  Ironically, China's disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have.

2. Demographic trends.  At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any country.  However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in 1979.  The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations.  What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that "within a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline."  The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled China's economic miracle has already begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out.  In the years ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending.

3. Economic dependency.  China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a springboard to economic development.  According to the CIA's 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of China's gross domestic product.  But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible wasn't drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes China's prosperity -- per capita GDP is below $10,000 -- much more vulnerable than America's.  China has sold over $100 billion more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy won't persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests.  China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it can't run the risk of really scaring its trading partners.

4. Political culture.  Because the Communist Party monopolizes power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political system.  Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption.  Bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic.  The Guardian reports that military posts are sold "for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each," creating a "vicious circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost."  Favoritism towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in massive inefficiencies.  President Xi Jinping's crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New York's Tweed Ring.  But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas China's political culture offers no such solution.

5. Military weakness.  That brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun this commentary -- Chinese military power.  Military.com reports today that the Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of China's military buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering anti-ship missiles to anti-satellite weapons.  Those programs actually exist, but the threat they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clear.  For instance, Beijing doesn't have the reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world.  Much has been written about China's supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which can't reach America; the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage.

Beijing's decision to sustain only a modest -- some would say minimal -- nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power.  Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power.  When these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous.  China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nation's economy and defenses.  In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.

Video: Training China’s next generation of business leaders: